SCNET · Enterprise IT · Ankara, Türkiye

Sanal Çekirdek

Someone who thinks like an attacker should test your defense.

Attack simulation shows not whether a weakness exists but whether it leads all the way to the target. Sanal Çekirdek shapes the test around your real threat scenario.

The number of vulnerabilities found is not a measure of success. The real question is what your defense saw as that path was walked, when it saw it, and what it did.

Objective and scenario definition

A test does not begin with 'look at everything'; it begins with explicit written authorization and a defined scope. The asset worth protecting and a realistic attacker profile are established first, and the scenario follows that profile's capability. Techniques seen in your own sector take priority.

  • Scope starts from an asset, not from a network range
  • The attacker profile is defined by capability level
  • Excluded systems and hours are written down
  • An emergency stop channel exists before testing starts

Surface discovery and entry points

The externally visible surface is usually wider than an organization believes: forgotten subdomains, test environments, leaked credentials, misconfigured shares. Discovery is the first moment the inventory meets reality.

  • Discovery output is compared against your inventory
  • Assets missing from the inventory are reported separately
  • Leaked credentials are searched in open sources
  • Test environments are treated as seriously as production

Chaining the path

Findings that look low-impact alone can combine into a path that reaches the target. The simulation builds that chain: initial access, privilege escalation, lateral movement, objective. Every step is documented with evidence.

  • A chain outranks individual findings in priority
  • Each step is evidenced with captures and logs
  • Data exfiltration is simulated, never actually performed
  • Whether traces are left is agreed in advance

How the defense responded

The most valuable output is which step the defense saw. After the test, your logs are reconciled against the test log; unseen steps are marked as blind spots and become detection rule proposals.

  • Test logs are reconciled with your own logs
  • Every unseen step produces a detection proposal
  • Steps seen but not escalated are noted separately
  • Proposals transfer directly into rule authoring

How we work

  1. Define the asset to protect and the attacker profile
  2. Write the rules of engagement and the stop channel
  3. Discover the surface and compare it to the inventory
  4. Build the chain and evidence every step
  5. Reconcile what the defense saw and produce rules

How success is measured

  • Discovery leaves no asset outside the inventory
  • Every chain built is fully evidenced
  • Unseen steps have become detection rules
  • The same chain is closed at the next test

Frequently asked questions

Can testing run against production?

It can, once rules of engagement and a stop channel are in place. Destructive techniques stay out of scope, and any step carrying outage risk is agreed with you beforehand.

How does this differ from vulnerability scanning?

A scan is a list; a simulation is a path. A scan may show ten low-impact findings; a simulation combines three of them into a chain that reaches the target.

Should our team be told in advance?

Either approach works and each measures something different. An announced test widens coverage; an unannounced one shows the real response. Whichever is chosen is stated in the report.

Name the asset you want protected; we will show you, with evidence, how an attacker would reach it.

Define a simulation scope